What?
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- Statutory backing for
transferring government subsidies and benefits and also lay down a
regulatory framework to protect core biometric information of AADHAAR
card holder from any unauthorised
disclosure or sharing
- Individual privacy
- Public service delivery
- Subsidy rationalisation
- Data Security
|
Aadhaar
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- A unique identification by
12 digit number and based on demographic and biometric information
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Features
|
- Entitlements
- Every resident is
entitled to obtain Aadhaar (person resided for more than 182 days in
one year)
- Institutional
- Establishing UIDAI
(Unified Identification Authority of India)
- Establishment, operation
and maintenance of Central Identity Data Repository
- It will not confer right
of or proof of citizenship of domicile
- Data Security
- Data will be collected
and protected at very high level
- Biometric will be used
only for enrolment and authentication
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Earlier efforts
|
National
Identification Authority of India bill 2010
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Pros
|
- Subsidy rationalisation
- Control the leakages
- Better targeting
- Privacy protection regime
in the country will be initiated
- To bypass SC order to make
it mandatory for the schemes like DBT
- Efficient, targeted and
transparent delivery of subsidies, benefits and services
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Cons
|
- Right to Privacy
- Should it not be overseen
by an Independent Judicial Authority
- Section 5 and 57 enable to
impose Aadhaar identification in virtually any context
- Infringement of democracy
and civil liberties
- Mass surveillance per se
is an
- Freedom of Speech and
expression : Even mere existence of a mass surveillance , stifle the
dissent
- Building an
infrastructure of social control
- Money bill
- Pre-empting any serious
discussion of these issue
- Against the spirit of
cooperative federalism
- Section(33)
- Data can used for the
purpose of national security authorised by JS or Court
- Depended on the
benevolence of government
- Inefficiencies of
district judges
- limited safeguard:
internal procedural safeguards
without independent external monitoring are inadequate for the
protection of rights
- Solution
- Replace national
security with public safety and public emergency
- Inclusion or CVC or CAG
in the committee
- Making Aadhaar optional
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Challenges
|
Misuses
- AADHAR card by migrants
- Data can used by
corporates to harness unethical gain
Security
- Data protection
- Weak Cyber security
structure
Operational
- Authentication failures
- Interoperability if other
platforms are used
- Delays
- Not all can have biometric
Infrastructural
- Reliable Connectivity
problem
- Literacy
- Example : PDS in Rajasthan
and Ranchi
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Amendment proposed
|
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Alternative
solution
|
From UID to UID+ Rather than
single UID use of different unique
numbers linked to AADHAAR number Example in
MGNERGA instead of using 12 digit number, each authorised user of the system
like Bank would get a modified number that is cryptographically generated. Benefits
- Corporate or other users
could not create a linked database for profiling
- Privacy concern also
solved as cryptographic process could be restricted to authorised user
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Way ahead
|
Given the risk the core
principle should be 'minimum use ' and 'maximum safeguards' Justice A P Shah Committee
: Privacy law Independent Judicial
Control Grievance redressal
mechanism National Security
- Replace national security
with public safety and public emergency
- CVG and Cag could be
included in the review committee
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Conclusion
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- We must ensure that UID
database is not used in a manner that can hurt the citizen either
accidently or by mission creep with unintended consequences
- Biometric determination of
identity will not be panacea as eligibility will still be governed by
the criteria like income, etc.
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